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Implications of the Shift to Defined
Contribution Plans for Retirement
Wealth Accumulation
William G. Gale and Joseph M. Milano
Pension wealth constitutes a sizable portion of households' retirement
resources. Close to half of civilian nonagricultural workers participate in
pension plans.' Future income flows from private pensions accounted for
20 percent of the wealth of households aged 65-69 in 1991 (Poterba,
Venti, and Wise 1994, table 1). Thus the relation between pensions and
other household wealth can have important implications for policy is-
sues, such as how to raise the saving rate or assure adequate saving for
retirement, as well as for more fundamental issues, such as how people
make economic decisions about the future.
Over the past twenty years, the U.S. pension system has shifted toward
defined contribution plans and away from defined benefit plans. This
shift provides opportunities as well as risks. For example, workers typ-
ically possess more authority to determine participation, contribution
levels, and portfolio choices in defined contribution plans than in de-
fined benefi t plans. The effects of such changes on the role of pensions in
retirement wealth accumulation remains an open question.
This chapter examines these issues. The first section provides back-
ground on the shift toward defined contributions plans. The second
section reviews evidence on the effects of pension wealth on households'
nonpension wealth. An important shortcoming of that literature is the
absence ofa distinction between the potentially different roles ofdefined
contribution and defined benefit plans. The third section discusses how
DC and DB plans might differentially affect wealth accumulation. The
fourth section presents estimates from the 1980s and the 1990s on these
issues.
A final section provides concluding remarks. We find that understand-
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ing the implications for retirement saving of the trend toward defined
contribution plans is a complex and unsettled issue for at least three
reasons. First, the effects of pensions on wealth accumulation has proven
to be complicated and difficult to untangle. Second, there are numerous
differences between the features ofdefined contribution plans and those
of defined benefit plans. Third, the nature of the plans and the samples
of workers they attract have changed over the past decade and a half.
Despite these difficulties, we note some relatively clear evidence of het-
erogeneity across workers in their response to different types of pensions,
and highlight the uncertainties that remain.
The Rise of Defined Contribution Plans
By almost any measure, the U.S. pension system has shifted toward de-
fined contribution plans over the past twenty years. The share of de-
fined contribution plans rose from 67 percent to 87 percent of all plans
from 1975 to 1992, from 29 to 60 percent of all active pal-ticipants, from
35 to 72 percent of all contributions, and from 28 to 45 percent of all
pension assets (USDOL 1996).2 What is perhaps less well known is that
at least part of the trend appears to predate the passage of ERISA in
1974. Among plans initiated before 1941 but still in effect in 1985, 10.4
percent were defined contribution plans (Clark and McDermed 1990).
The figure rises to 16.8 percent for plans initiated in 1942-53, 24.8 per-
cent for plans initiated in 1954-63,31.3 percent for plans initiated be-
tween 1964-73,47.4 percent for plans initiated between 1974-79, and
60.0 percent for plans initiated in 1980-85. A related trend is the re-
cent growth in hybrid plans, which combine features of defined benefit
and defined contribution plans. While less is known about these plans,
they may be seen as an attempt to balance the costs and benefits of de-
fined COLltIibution and defined benefit plans (EBRI 1996; Rappaport
1996).
These trends have been attributed in varying degrees to increased
regulation of defined benefit plans following the passage of ERISA in
1974, the changing composition of the work force, and other factors. 3
From 1984 to 1992, however, contributions to DC plans rose by $50 bil-
lion, while 401 (k) contributions alone rose by $48 billion. Thus, explain-
ing the growth ofdefined contribution plans since 1984 is in large part an
effort to explain the growth of401(k) s.
Ippolito (1993, 1995) provides a model of the advantages of 401 (k)s.
Workers with low discount rates - those who place a relatively high value
on the future over the present-are assumed to be more productive than
others. For example, they may place a higher value on future wages than
would a high discounter, and so would work harder to develop a reputa-
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tion as a reliable employee. A 401 (k) plan can help firms retain low
discounters and exclude high discounters. High discounters will find
leaving the firm more attractive, because 401 (k) balances can be cashed
in upon exit. Low discounters will have incentives to stay because the
matching provision of 401 (k)s implies that they are in effect paid more
than high discounters. Ippolito provides evidence consistent with these
hypotheses. As discussed below, this model has important implications
for examining the role of pensions on saving.
Effects of Pensions on the Accumulation of Wealth
Theoretical Concerns
In the simplest life cycle economic models, workers aloe posited to save
only for retirement. Changing the form of workers' compensation from
current wages to future pension benefits has no effect on consumption,
and no effect on overall (pension plus nonpension) wealth or saving.
Increases in pension wealth are offset completely by reductions in other
wealth.
A number of issues, however, complicate the model when we move
toward more realism. First, pensions are typically illiquid, tax-deferred
annuities, unlike conventional taxable assets. Illiquidity implies that pen-
sions may raise overall saving for households that cannot borrow as much
as they would like (Hubbard 1986). DefeITal of taxes raises the after-tax
return on pension contributions relative to fully taxable saving. If pen-
sions are the mal-ginal source of saving, the higher return will generate
income and substitution effects that work in opposite directions, so that
the effect of pensions on overall saving is ambiguous. On one hand, if
pension saving is inframarginal, raising the return on contributions
should reduce overall saving. Also, as annuities, pensions provide insur-
ance against uncertain lifespan, which would reduce overall saving (Hub-
bard 1987). As group annuities, pensions can provide more favorable
terms than individual annuities, which will induce income and substitu-
tion effects in opposite directions (Feldstein 1978). On the other hand,
pensions may also induce earlier retirement, which would be expected to
raise saving among workers (Feldstein 1974). Therefore, even in a model
where people save only for retirement, the effect of pension wealth on
other wealth accumulation is ambiguous.
Also, people save for reasons other than retirement. Pensions will be
poor substitutes for precautionary saving (Samwick 1994), intended be-
quests (Bernheim 1991), or saving for other nonretirement purposes. In
such cases, changing a worker's compensation to include more pension
wealth and less cash wages may not reduce other saving.
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Additionally, a number of alternative models of saving have been pro-
posed in which households are believed to make saving decisions based
on psychological or behavioral models (Thaler 1990; Bernheim 1996)
and frequently lack basic levels of economic literacy (Bernheim 1994,
this volume). In these models, pension wealth may not reduce, and may
even raise, nonpension wealth.'
Empirical Findings
Numerous studies have examined the impact of pensions on wealth.'
Most of the studies suggest that an increased dollar of pension wealth
reduces other wealth by at most 20 cents, and almost half of the studies
suggest either that pensions have no effect at all on nonpension wealth or
that pensions raise nonpension wealth. Previous empirical work, how-
ever, imposes a series ofsystematic statistical biases, which cause the stud-
ies to overstate the effect of pensions on other wealth (Gale, 1996). Some
of the biases can generate an estimated positive effect of pensions on
nonpension wealth, even when increases in pensions in fact reduce other
wealth. These biases cast doubt on prior findings.
Correcting for none of the biases, Gale (1996) finds that a dollar in-
crease in pension wealth reduces other wealth by 10 percent or less. After
correcting for five (of the eight) biases, he finds that a dollar increase in
pension wealth reduces other wealth by 40-80 cents, depending on the
specification. Some estimates also suggest substantial heterogeneity in
how households respond to pensions (Bernheim and Scholz 1993; Gale
1996). Thus, there remains substantial uncertainty concerning the im-
pact of pensions on household wealth.
Studies of the impact of 401 (k)s on saving have also produced discor-
dant results° and also suffer from a series of econometric biases, most of
which overstate the impact of401 (k)s on saving and at least one ofwhich
may lead to an understatement of the effects.
The Correlation Between Pension Coverage and
Preferences for SaVing
One of the clearest biases, and one of the most difficult to resolve, arises if
households with pensions also have higher "tastes" or preferences for
saving than households with similar observable characteristics that do
not have pensions. This could occur in several ways. Firms where em-
ployees had stronger than average tastes for saving could face more de-
mands to create pension plans. Alternatively, if firms provided pensions
randomly, workers with stronger tastes for saving would naturally be more
attracted to firms with better pension plans, other things being equal.
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These patterns would bias the empirical relationship toward finding that
pensions raise overall household saving. Some evidence suggest that pen-
sion coverage (or wealth) is positively correlated with tastes for saving,
but the findings are not conclusive.7 We consider this issue in greater
detail below.
Distinctions Between Defined Contribution and
Defined Benefit Plans
Studies of how pensions affect wealth have largely ignored differences
between DB and DC plans. But differences in the features of the plans
could have an impact on how pensions affect wealth; so the impact of
pensions on wealth could be changing over time as the pension system
evolves. This section highlights how several differences between the plan
types might differentially influence wealth accumulation."
Worker Choices and Sample Selection
At first glance, it may seem plausible that eligibility for 401 (k)s is inde-
pendent of household's tastes for saving. Mter all, as Poterba, Venti, and
Wise (1995, p. 10) note, "eligibility is determined by employers." But
while employers ultimately decide on the policy, the relevant issue is
whether employers take employee preferences into account. In a survey
of a broad range of employers, "perceived employee interest" was the
second most frequently stated reason that a firm installed a 401 (k) plan
and was noted by 63.5 percent of respondents (Buck Consultants, 1989).
This should not be surprising; it would be strange if employers created
benefits without regard to employee preferences. Moreover, even if firms
did provide 401 (k) s randomly, we would expect workers with high tastes
for saving to seek out firms with 401 (k)s or to encourage their firms to
provide 401 (k)s. Either way, eligibility is likely to be positively correlated
with tastes for saving.
Ultimately, this is an empirical issue. Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1995)
present regressions showing that eligible households have about the
same level ofnonpension, non-401 (k) financial assets as ineligible house-
holds, controlling for income and other factors. They conclude that
401 (k) eligibility is exogenous with respect to tastes for saving. But En-
gen, Gale, and Scholz (\ 994, table 8), using the same data set, a slightly
different test format, and a longer list of explanatory variables, find that
eligible families have higher levels of nonpension, non-401(k) financial
assets, net financial assets, and net worth. Moreover, Poterba, Venti, and
Wise (1995) omit pensions. Families eligible for 401 (k)s are between 24
and 33 percentage points more likely to be covered by a defined benefit
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pension plan than other families, controlling for other factors (Engen,
Gale, and Scholz, 1994). Again, this implies that eligible households have
higher non-401 (k) wealth than ineligible households.9
The Poterba, Venti, and Wise test has another problem that creates a
potentially large bias in favor of finding that eligibility is exogenous: the
test ignores all 401 (k) wealth and thereby assumes that all 401 (k) saving is
new saving. To determine whether 401 (k) eligibility is exogenous re-
quires knowing whether eligible families would have saved more than
ineligible families in the absence of 401 (k) s. Since no data sources track
eligible families before 401 (k)s were introduced, the exogeneity test
used by Poterba, Venti, and Wise requires some assumption about what
would have happened to 401 (k) wealth had 401 (k)s not existed. If x
percent of 401 (k) wealth would have existed anyway, an appropriate test
ofexogeneity compares the non-401 (k) assets of ineligible families to the
sum of non-401 (k) assets plus x percent of the 401 (k) wealth of eligible
families. Clearly, assuming that all 401 (k) saving is new saving (x=O) - as
in the Poterba, Venti and Wise test-creates a strong bias in favor of
finding that eligibility is exogenous. For all these reasons, we believe that
401 (k) eligibility and participation are positively correlated with tastes
for saving. This implies that cross-sectional tests of the effects of 40I (k) s
that do not control for households' tastes for saving will overstate the
effects of 401 (k)s on wealth accumulation.
A related issue is how the difference in tastes for saving between
401 (k)-eligible and ineligible households has changed over time. Bern-
heim (1996) claims that the average "taste for saving" among eligible
households has become diluted over time. The logic of the claim is that
the most dedicated savers are most likely to become eligible for 401 (k)s
early on. As less dedicated savers became eligible, average tastes for saving
fell among eligible households.
But the direction of the net bias caused by dilution is unclear. Over
time, the most dedicated savers among ineligible households are the ones
most likely to become eligible; so there is dilution among ineligible
households, too. The key issue for estimation is the relative dilution of
the two groups, not the absolute dilution in one group. Bernheim claims
that trends in IRA participation are a "good indication" of dilution.
But dilution concerns unobservable characteristics ("tastes for saving"),
whereas IRA participation depends on observable and unobservable fac-
tors. Probit analysis using the SIPP shows that controlling for household
characteristics, IRA participation among eligible households fell by only
1.3 percentage points relative to ineligible households from 1987 to 1991.
Thus, changes in unobservable variables - the source of dilution -led to
only a slight change in relative IRA participation.
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If dilution of the sample of 401 (k)-eligible workers were empirically
important, the proportion of such workers making 401 (k) contributions
should have fallen over time. Instead, data from the Current Population
Survey show that it rose from 57 percent in 1988 to 65 percent in 1993
(Bassett, Fleming, and Rodrigues 1996).10 Also, workers with low tastes
for saving can and frequently do liquidate their 401 (k) upon leaving a
firm (Bassett, Fleming, and Rodrigues 1996), which raises the average
tastes for saving among eligible families and may reduce it among ineligi-
ble families. The model in Ippolito (this volume) also suggests a mecha-
nism by which average tastes for saving among eligible workers could
plausibly rise, not fall, over time. Thus, it is unclear whether the sample of
eligible households became more or less diluted relative to ineligible
households over this period.
A question still remains concerning whether DB pension coverage re-
mains positively correlated with tastes for saving, now that 401 (k) plans
have expanded so greatly. It is worth noting that households with DB
pensions have higher rates of 401 (k) eligibility than those who do not
have traditional pensions. II This suggests substantial overlap between
households with 401 (k)s and households with DB plans and suggests that
households with DB plans may still have higher than average tastes for
saving. But the degree of selection into these pension plans may have
decreased over time.
Benefit Levels
It is often asserted that defined contribution plans are on average less
generous than defined benefit plans. If so, then the impact of DC cover-
age should have a smaller (in absolute value) effect on other wealth than
DB coverage would have. However, in a study ofseveral hundred pension
plans in existence in the 1980s, Samwick and Skinner (1993) conclude
that defined contribution plans are on average about as generous as
defined benefit plans.
Risks
DB and DC plans create different kinds of risks. In DB plans, benefits are
linked to the highest few years of earnings, whereas in DC plans benefits
are essentially a weighted average of earnings over many years. Thus,
different patterns of earnings uncertainty will create different risk pat-
terns across the two types of plans.
Rules regarding (nominal) benefits in a DB plan are set by the em-
ployer in advance. Benefits in a DC plan depend on the rate of return
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earned on pension assets, which depends on choices made by the partici-
pant. Both DB and DC benefits are subject to inflation risk.
Samwick and Skinner (1993) conclude that DC plans present less risk
to participants than DB plans do.'" If so, then DC plans may well en-
gender less precautionary saving than DC plans do, and so have a larger
negative impact on other saving.
liquidity
Participants in DC plans can often borrow against their pension balance
or access the funds for hardship reasons. Upon leaving ajob, DC partici-
pants frequently roll over the balance into another pension or cash in the
proceeds, subject to tax and penalty (Bassett, Fleming, and Rodrigues
1996). Although DB benefits have become increasingly liquid over time
and can be cashed in upon exiting the firm in certain circumstances
(mainly when the present value offuture benefits is low), DB benefits are
in general less liquid than DC benefits. Increased liquidity makes assets in
DC plans better substitutes for household precautionary saving or for
target saving, such as saving for downpayrnents or for college expenses,
than DB plans are. This increased substitutability may raise DC contribu-
tions, but make those contributions more likely to be removed before
retirement than would DB contributions. The net effect on retirement
saving is ambiguous.
Visibility and Simplicity
Accruing balances are probably simpler to understand in DC plans for
most participants. Whether increased visibility raises or reduces house-
holds' other saving depends in part on whether the household accrues
more or less than it would otherwise have guessed in its DC plan. By
providing periodic updates on balances, DC plans may more effectively
remind households of the need to save for retirement. Ofcourse, there is
no reason why such updates could not also be provided in a DB plan.
In short, although the plans differ in several ways, it is difficult to
identifY unambiguous implications of these differences for how pensions
affect wealth. Nevertheless, several items are worth emphasizing. The
mechanisms through which pensions affect wealth can be exceedingly
complex. There is no reason to expect the two types of plans to have
identical impacts on the level or structure of household wealth, even if
the benefit levels were held constant. There can be substantial variation
within plan types as well as across plan types. And secular shifts in the
pension system could be altering the way pensions affect retirement
wealth accumulation.
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Empirical Analysis
To analyze these issues further, we examine the relation between non-
pension wealth, defined benefit coverage, and defined contribution cov-
erage in two separate data sets from the 1980s and 1990s.
Evidence from the 1983 Survey of Consumer Finances
The 1983 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) contains interviews with
3,824 U.S. households in 1983, along with a supplemental survey of 438
high-income households. The SCF was designed specifically to collect
data on household balance sheets. It also contains detailed information
on pensions, demographic characteristics, income, and othervariables.13
Ideally, the regressions would control for the present value of previous
and future earnings and inheritances. Because it is not generally possible
to construct earnings histories and futures with the available data, the
regressions instead control for age of the household head, years ofeduca-
tion (averaged over the head and spouse), earnings of the head and
spouse, an interaction term between age and earnings, family size, mari-
tal status, and an indicator variable for the presence of two earners.
These variables will be correlated with lifetime measures of wages and
provide proxies for consumption demands as well.
The regressions also contain a variable that takes the value of 1 if either
the head or spouse is covered by a defined benefit plan or defined contri-
bution plan (this variable is called pension coverage) and a second vari-
able indicating whether either the head or spouse has a defined contribu-
tion plan. The first variable shows differences between the population
with pensions and those without and is meant to capture the effect of
having a pension. The second captures the effect, conditional on having
a pension, of having a defined contribution pension, and thus provides
information on the difference between DC and DB plans on wealth accu-
mulation. Of course, the DC variable will also pick up other differences
between the two plans, such as differences in the types of households en-
rolled in each. Ideally, pension wealth measures would be used here. But
using pension wealth introduces a number ofadditional biases, which are
exacerbated when estimating the differential effects of DB versus DC
plans (Gale 1995).
We explore the effects of pension coverage on two different measures
of wealth: financial assets and nonpension private wealth, including
housing (but not Social Security benefits). In each case, balances in
defined contribution plans, profit-sharing plans, and so on are excluded
from the measure of nonpension wealth, but trigger the pension vari-
ables to take the value 1. IRA and Keogh plans do not count as pension
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TABU: I Sample Characteristics, 1983 Survey of Consumer Finances
Households with Households without
A II households fRAorKeogh fRA or Keogh
VariaiJ/£ Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Financial assets 65,699 8,875 149,185 36,187 26,075 3,098
Netwonh 214,541 84,134 420,353 145,912 116,858 59,532
Age of head 50.1 50 51.8 52 49.3 48
Education 12.5 12 13.8 14 11.9 12
Family earnings 47,119 38,253 67,801 55,574 37,301 32,133
Family size 2.9 3 2.9 3 2.9 3
Married 0.650 0.747 0.603
Two earners 0.401 0.491 0.358
Have DB plan 0.615 0.658 0.594
Have DC plan 0.111 0.146 0.094
Have DB or DC plan 0.706 0.784 0.669
Have IRA or Keogh 0.322 1.000 0.000
Sample size 829 339 490
Source: Authors' calculations using the 1983 Survey of Consumer Finances.
Now: All dollar figures are in 1995 dollars. "Financial assets" are defined as the sum of checking
and saving accounts. money market accounts, certificates of deposit, biUs and bonds, stocks,
mutua] funds, cash value of life insurance, balances in employment-related thrift accounts, and
other financial assets. "Net worth" is defined as the sum of housing equity, financial assets, busi-
ness equity, and other real estate, less unsecured debt. Other variables are defined in the text.
coverage and so are included in the measures of nonpension wealth. The
literature indicates that using broader measures ofwealth often produces
larger estimates of the offset between pensions and other saving. 14 As
discussed above, the pure life cycle model suggests that pensions should
substitute for other retirement saving, but not necessarily for other sav-
ing. The problem in practice is determining what qualifies as a retire-
ment asset for example, should housing wealth be included as retire-
ment wealth? Our view is that it is best not to prejudge or assume the
answer. Thus, the most relevant measure for estimates of pension offset is
the broadest possible measure of wealth.15 For example, if most saving is
nonretirement saving, that will show up in the estimates as little offset.
However, the distinction, even at a conceptual level, is murky. Precaution-
ary saving balances that do not get used up in the working years become
retirement saving.
The sample focuses on households where the head is age 40 to 64,
where the head works at least 1,000 hours per year and describes that
activity as working full time, where no one in the household is self-
employed, and where no one in the household is a farmer or farm man-
ager. These restrictions were imposed to provide a sample of households
with a minimum ofextenuating circumstances regarding wealth accumu-
Will/am G. Gale and Joseph M. Milano 125
TABLE 2 Effects of Pension Coverage on Nonpension Wealth,
1983 Survey of Consumer Finances
LAD regression coefficients (t-statistics)
Dependent
variable Coefficient on . . .
All Families with Families without
families IRA or Keogh IRA or Keogh
Financial assets
Net worth
Sample size
DC coverage 18,028 23,437 2,604
(1.91 ) (1.11 ) (0.59)
Pension coverage (27,349) (61,411) (8,535)
(3.77) (3.38) (1.37)
DC coverage 31,129 167,690 22,315
(1.61) (2.02) (0.65)
Pension coverage (81,927) (273,393) (66,600)
(5.25) (2.27) (1.27)
829 339 490
Source: Authors' calculations using the 1983 Survey of Consumer Finances.
Note: All dollar figures are in 1995 dollars. "Financial assets" are defined as the sum of
checking and saving accounts. money market accounts, certificates of deposit, bills and
bonds, stocks, mutual funds, cash value of life insurance, balances in employment-related
thrift accounts, and other financial assets. "Net worth" is defined as the sum of housing
equity. financial assets. business equity, and other ..eal estate. less unsecured debt
lation. Hence, the results may not be applicable to the broader popu-
lation. We also excluded households that could not say whether their
pension was a DC or DB plan. The remaining sample consists of 829
households.
Two caveats are immediately relevant for this sample. The first is the
relatively small sample size. The second is the finding in Mitchell (1988),
based on a comparison of answers in the original SCF survey and in a
supplemental pension provider survey, that a sizable minority of respon-
dents appeared to misstate their pension type in the original survey.
Table 1 reports the means and medians of the variables used in the
analysis. The sample is relatively affluent, most households are married,
fewer than half have two earners. About 61 percent of the households
have defined benefit coverage, while 11 percent have defined contribu-
tion coverage. There is remarkably little overlap: few households in the
sample have both DB and DC coverage. About one-third of the sample
holds an IRA or Keogh plan.
Table 2 reports the regression results for the effecLS of defined benefit
and defined contribution pension coverage for the overall sample. Be-
cause there is substantial heterogeneity in households' tastes for saving,
ordinary least squares estimation generates nonsensical resulLS for esti-
mates of pension offsets.'6 To address this issue, we use least absolute
deviations estimators. These regressions indicate the effecLS of pensions
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on the typical, or median, household rather than the average (mean)
household, and are thus much less sensitive to the presence ofoutliers in
the data.
The results are shown in the first column ofTable 2. The typical house-
hold with a pension accumulated about $17,000 less in financial assets
than the typical household without a pension, controlling for other fac-
tors. This effect is statistically significant. Households with defined contri-
bution plans had more nonpension financial assets than those with de-
fined benefit plans, but still less than the typical household without a
pension.
These results must be interpreted cautiously. While they suggest that
DB plans displace more wealth than DC plans do, the finding could be
due to differing selection processes into each plan, as well as a host of
other issues.
Moreover, the estimates above require that each household have the
same response to pension wealth. Households may respond differently,
however, for a number of reasons. First, borrowing-eonstrained house-
holds may be unable to offset as much pension wealth as they would like
(Hubbard 1986). Second, models that contain both retirement saving
and precautionary saving suggest that the relative importance of the two
motives changes over the life cycle (Engen and Gale 1993; Hubbard,
Skinner, and Zeldes 1995; Samwick 1994). Pensions seem likely to be
poor substitutes for precautionary saving, but may be good substitutes for
other retirement saving. Third, some households may be poor planners,
financially iIIitel-ate, or "rule of thumb" consumers. For these house-
holds, pension offset may be very small, suggesting that the offset should
be related to factors that determine whether a household is in this
category.
To capture these differences across households, we estimate separate
equations for different groups, across which we expect the pension off-
sets to differ. Zeldes (1989) uses this strategy to test for the presence of
borrowing constraints. A large number ofadditional studies of consump-
tion and saving have followed similar strategies. In the current context,
this strategy may help resolve two additional problems as well. First, the
same reasoning that suggests that the coefficient on pension wealth will
differ across groups also suggests that the response ofwealth to any of the
right hand side variables could vary as well. For example, a bonowing-
constrained household may have a different response to pension wealth
as well as a different age-wealth profile, so borrowing constraints would
affect the coefficien t on age as well as the pension offset. Second, under
certain circumstances discussed below, estimating different equations for
different groups may be a natural way to control for heterogeneity in
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unobservable tastes for saving and the potential endogeneity of such
tastes with respect to pensions.17
The sample is divided into subsamples depending on whether the
household has a positive balance in an IRA/Keogh. Households with
positive saving incentive balances are less likely to be borrowing con-
strained, 18 more likely to be saving for retirement, and more likely to be
financially literate. Thus, we expect households with saving incentives to
exhibit more substitution between pensions and other wealth than other
households would. There is of course no claim that this criteria splits the
sample into two perfectly homogeneous groups. Rather, the idea is to
split the sample such that households in one group differ systematically
on average from households in the other group.
Although it allows for different groups to have different responses to
pensions, the sample-splitting strategy we employ may generate a poten-
tial endogeneity problem. For example, households with IRAs exhibit
stronger tastes for saving than other households, controlling for observ-
able characteristics (Gale and Scholz 1994; Engen, Gale, and Scholz
1994). When the dependent variable is net worth, however, splitting the
sample on the basis of tastes for saving may create sample selection bias.
In any case, the direction of the bias for estimating pension offset is
unclear, and the selection bias disappears under certain distributional
assumptions. 19 Nevertheless, potential sample selection bias is an impor-
tant caveat to all the results below that examine the heterogeneity of
responses to pension wealth across groups. The smaller sample size cre-
ated in each subsample is an additional caveat to these results.
The last four columns of Table 1 report means and medians for the
samples with and without IRAs and Keoghs. Households holding such
accounts are more affluent, more likely to be married and to have two
earners, and more likely to have either a defined benefit or a defined
contribution plan.
The last two columns ofTable 2 show the results of splitting the sample.
The negative effect of pensions on wealth is larger among households
with lRAs or Keoghs than those without. This is consistent with more
offset occurring in the group with lRAs or Keoghs, but could also be
caused by those households' having larger pensions. In each case, the
impact of DB plans is estimated to be larger in absolute value than the
impact of DC plans.
Evidence from the Health and Retirement Study
The Health and Retirement Study (Wave I) contains interviews with
7,702 households where either the head or spouse was aged between 51
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TABLE 3 Sample Characteristics, 1992 Health and Retirement Study
Households
Households with without
All households IRA or Keogh IRA orKeogh
Variable Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Financial assets 53,639 15,207 100,126 52,140 16,546 2,390
Net worth 152,942 84,510 245,146 164,023 79,374 43,450
Age of head 55.6 55 56.0 56 55.3 55
Education 12.6 12 13.5 13 12.0 12
Family earnings 44,796 39,105 55,509 49,967 36,248 31,501
Household size 2.3 2 2.3 2 2.3 2
Married 0.611 0.685 0.551
Two earners 0.369 0.452 0.304
Have DB plan 0.567 0.635 0.512
Have DC plan 0.361 0.471 0.273
Have DB or DC plan 0.711 0.799 0.641
Have IRA or Keogh 0.444 1.000 0.000
Sample size 2,641 1,053 1,588
Source: Authors' calculations using the 1992 Health and Retirement Study.
Note: All dollar figures are in 1995 dollars. "Financial assets" are defined as the sum of
checking and saving accounts, money market accounts, certificates of deposit, bills and
bonds, IRA and Keogh balances, stocks, mutual funds, and investment trusts. "Net worth"
is defined as the sum of housing equity, financial assets, business equity, and other real
estate. Other variables are defined in the text.
and 62 in 1992. The HRS collected detailed data on households' wealth,
health and disability status, income, and demographic factors. In the
near future, a pension provider survey may be available, which will allow
more detailed examination of pensions and wealth.2o
The basic sample exclusions are similar to those using the SCF: all
households where the head was working less than 1,000 hours per year,
all farm households, all households where someone is self-employed, and
all who did not know what type of pension they had. The remaining
sample consists of2,641 households.
Table 3 shows the means and medians of the variables used in the
analysis. Like the 1983 SCF sample, the 1992 HRS sample is affluent.
Defined benefit coverage is lower in the HRS, but defined contribution
coverage more than tripled from 1983. A potentially important differ-
ence with the 1983 sample is that roughly 40 percent ofdefined contribu-
tion plans are held by families that also have defined benefit coverage. In
the 1983 sample, there was virtually no overlap. This is an important
caveat in comparing the coefficients across the samples.
The first column of Table 4 reports regression results for the overall
sample. Financial assets are smaller for those with pensions than for those
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TABLE 4 Effects of Pension Coverage on Nonpension Wealth, 1992 Health and
Retirement Study
LAD regression coefficients (t-statistics)
Dependent
variable Coefficient on . . .
All Families with Families without
families IRA or Keogh IRA or Keogh
Financial assets DC coverage
Pension coverage
Net worth DC coverage
Pension coverage
Sample size
6,477
(4.69)
(3,814)
(2.54)
21,998
(2.50)
(4,820)
(0.28)
2,641
1,993
(0.48)
(8,505)
(2.30)
7,277
(0.72)
(26,677)
(1.60)
1,053
234
(0.49)
92
(0.23)
6,635
(1.61)
13,528
(3.23)
1,588
Source: Authors' calculations using the 1992 Health and Retirement Study.
Note: All dollar figures are in 1995 dollars. "Financial assets" are defined as the sum of
checking and saving accounts, money market accounts, certificates of deposit, bills and
bonds, IRA and Keogh balances, stocks, mutual funds, and investment trusts. "Net worth"
is defined as the sum of housing equity, financial assets, business equity, and other real
estate.
without, But the typical household with a defined contribution plan has
more wealth than the typical household with a defined benefit plan and
even more than the typical household without a pension.
Table 3 also shows means and medians ofvariables for the samples with
and without IRAs and Keoghs. The relative patterns are the same as in
1983, The sample with IRAs and Keoghs is much more affluent that
households without either saving incentive.
The last two columns ofTable 4 show the results of splitting the sample
by saving incentive status. Pension coverage has a larger negative effect
on households with lRAs and Keoghs than on other households. Control-
ling for pension coverage, the impact of defined contribution coverage
on nonpension wealth is estimated to be positive but not significantly
different from zero.
Discussion and Comparisons
These results present interesting patterns, First, the impact of pension
coverage on nonpension wealth is consistently negative in 1983, but not
in 1992. This could be due to shifts in the tastes for saving of households
covered by pensions relative to those not covered by pensions, As dis-
cussed above, there are a number of reasons to think that the sample of
401 (k)-eligible households raised their tastes for saving relative to ineligi-
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ble households. Second, controlling for pension coverage, DC plans had
a consistently positive coefficient in 1983, though not always significant.
The effect in 1992 was generally smaller and less statistically significant.
Unfortunately, we are unable to conclusively identity just one inter-
pretation of these results. They could be due to changes in relative tastes
for saving among the groups, changes in the relative generosity of dif-
ferent plans, or the fact that DC plans in 1992 were much more likely
to represent second plans. In addition, the SCF sample is somewhat
younger than the HRS sample, which could also influence the results.
Conclusion
The long-term shift toward defined contribution plans could have impor-
tant effects on how pensions interact with preparations for retirement.
Each of the differences between DB and DC plans along dimensions of
risks, liquidity, visibility, sample selection, and so on, has implications for
how other saving should be affected. As described above, understanding
the effects of pension on wealth is a complex task. Disentangling the
differential impacts ofDC and DB plans is even more difficult due to data
limitations, shifts in unobserved variables (such as the tastes for saving
among the pool of DC participants), and a large number of underlying
models of saving behavior.
Against this backdrop, the empirical results developed here suggest
that DB and DC plans can have different effects on wealth, that there is
heterogeneity in responses to pensions, and that important endogeneity
problems may be biasing the results. However, more definitive evidence
on the precise nature of the links between pension type and wealth
accumulation will have to await further developments of theory and data.
We thank Richard Ippolito, Olivia Mitchell, Nicholas Souleles, con-
ference participants, and the referees for very helpful comments. The
opinions are those of the authors and should not be ascribed to the
trustees, officers, or staff of the Brookings Institution.
Notes
1. EBRI (1994, table 2). This participation rate includes salary reduction plans
as well as more traditional defined benefit and defined contribution plans.
2. Other data provide further evidence on these trends. The proportion of the
workforce with a defined benefit plan as the primary pension fell from 39 percent
to 26 percent over the same period, while the proportion with primary defined
contribution plans rose from 6 to 20 percent, and the proportion with supple-
mental defined contribution plans rose from 9 to 17 percent (USDOL 1996).
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Defined contribution plans covered 80 percent of active participants in plans
established since 1975, compared to 33 percent in plans established before 1975
(Beller and Lawrence 1992).
3. On the role of regulations, see Clark and McDermed (1990), Gale (1994),
and Lichtenstein (1992). On the role of shifts in industrial composition and
employment, see Gustman and Steinmeier (1992), Ippolito (1995) and Kruse
(1991). See also Warshawsky (1995) for a related discussion.
4. An older tradition in the pension literature also advocates alternative models
of saving, with similar findings. Cagan (1965) suggests that the provision of pen-
sions makes workers realize the need to save for retirement, which raises their
nonpension saving. Katona (1965) suggests that pensions raise nonpension sav-
ing because they make households feel that attaining a reasonable standard of
living in retirement is more feasible, and because people tend to intensity their
efforts (e.g., saving) as they come closer to achieving their goal (e.g., reasonable
living standards in retirement).
5. See Gale (1995) for a review of the literature.
6. The literature is reviewed in Bernheim (1996), Engen, Gale, and Scholz
(1996), and Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1996).
7. Johnson (1993), using experimental data from the first wave of the Health
and Retirement Survey, finds that workers with higher risk aversion or lower time
preference rates are more likely to be covered by pensions. Also see Ippolito
(1993) and Allen, Clark, and McDermed (1993).
8. For further discussion, see Bodie, Marcus, and Merton (1988) and Samwick
and Skinner (1993).
9. Along similar lines, Bernheim and Garrett (1995) find that 401 (k) eligibility
"raises" total wealth by about four times as much as it "raises" retirement wealth.
Unless one is willing to believe that 401 (k) contributions crowd in several times
their value in non-401 (k) saving, these findings suggest that eligibility is positively
correlated with tastes for saving.
10. This increase is unlikely to be due to an increase in employer matching. In
1993, among eligible workers that did not receive a match, 60 percent contrib-
uted. Our own probit analysis using the SIPP indicates that between 1987 and
1991, controlling for household characteristics (including pension coverage),
the 401 (k) participation rate of eligible households rose by 8 percentage points,
and the increase was statistically significant.
II. Data from the 1991 SIPP suggest that, controlling for a host of household
characteristics, families with DB coverage are 25 percentage points more likely to
be eligible for a 401 (k) and 13 percentage points more likely to participate than
observationally equivalent households without DB coverage.
12. This calculation does not include the risk that taxpayers face through possi-
ble pension bailouts by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation.
13. For further information on the SCF, see Avery and Elliehausen (1988).
14. See Avery, Elliehausen, and Gustafson (1986) and Gale (1995). We estimate
the effects of pension coverage on the level, rather than the log ofwealth, for two
reasons. First, some households have negative wealth, for which the log is un-
defined. Second, pension offset is an arithmetic effect - a dollar of pension
wealth changes non pension wealth by x cents - rather than a multiplicative ef-
fect. A result framed in terms of an elasticity of wealth with respect to pensions-
say, that a 1 percent increase in pension wealth is associated with an x percent
change in non pension wealth - is not useful in determining pension offsets.
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15. Engen, Gale, and Scholz (1996) and Gale (1995, 1996) provide extensive
discussions of the value of examining the impact of pensions on broad measures
ofwealth.
16. Samwick (1994), for example, obtains ordinary least squares estimates that
suggest that one dollar of pension wealth raises other wealth by as much as six
dollars.
17. Another way to capture these different responses to pension wealth is to
make the measured offset a function of household characteristics. This strategy is
used, for example, by Venti and Wise (1990) and Gale and Scholz (1994) in
analyses of how IRAs affect saving, but would be difficult to apply in the current
context because it requires estimates of several additional parameters, which
would not be feasible given the relatively small sample size.
18. Since the data are from 1983 and universal eligibility for 1RAs was not
present until 1982, "having an IRA" is likely to be closely correlated with "making
an IRA contribution"' in 1983, suggesting that those with IRAs are not likely to be
borrowing constrained. Gale and Scholz (1994) provide further evidence on this
issue.
19. For example, suppose tastes for saving are given by e= VI + u for households
with saving incentives and e = v2 + u for households without saving incentives,
where the v's are constants, v2 ' v" u is normally distributed with mean zero, and
the u's and v's are uncorrelated. Then, in separating the sample, the v's would be
subsumed into the constant term in the regression and the expected value of u
would be zero in each subsample.
20. For more information on the Health and Retirement Study see Gustman,
Mitchell, and Steinmeier (1995) and the articles in Burkhauser and Gertler
(1995).
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